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Abstract:  This article discusses the microstructure of the U.S. Treasury securities market. 
Treasury securities are nominally riskless debt instruments issued by the U.S. government. 
Microstructural analysis is a field of economics/finance that examines the roles played by 
heterogenous agents, institutional detail, and asymmetric information in the trading process.  The 
article describes types of Treasury issues; stages of the Treasury market; the major players, 
including the role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the interdealer brokers; the 
structure of both the spot and futures markets; the findings of the seasonality/announcement and 
order book literature; and research on price discovery.  We conclude by discussing possible 
future avenues of research.  
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Algorithmic trading Algorithmic trading is the practice of automatically transacting based on
a quantitative model.
Broker A broker is a ﬁrm that matches buyers and sellers in ﬁnancial transactions. An in-
terdealer broker (IDB) is an intermediary providing trading services to hedge funds, institutions,
and other dealers. IDB’s handle the majority of Treasury securities transactions in the secondary
market.
Coupons Owners of Treasury notes and bonds receive periodic payments called coupons. They
are ﬁxed by the Treasury at auction and are typically paid semi-annually.
Depth Depth is the quantity the dealer is willing to sell at the bid or oﬀer.
Electronic communications networks (ECN) The Securities and Exchange Commission
deﬁnes electronic communications networks (ECNs) as “electronic trading systems that automati-
cally match buy and sell orders at speciﬁed prices.”
Market microstructure Market microstructure is a ﬁeld of economics that studies the price
formation process and trading procedures in security markets.
On-the-run On-the-run refers to the most recently auctioned Treasury security of a particular
maturity. After the next auction, the security goes oﬀ-the-run.
Price discovery The process by which prices adapt to new information.
Primary dealers Primary dealers are large brokerage ﬁrms and investment banks that are
permitted to trade directly with the Federal Reserve in exchange for making markets in Treasuries.
They provide the majority of liquidity in the Treasury market, participate in Treasury auctions,
and provide information to assist the Fed in implementing open market operations.
Secondary market After the initial auction of Treasury instruments, trading in on-the-run
and oﬀ-the-run securities makes up the secondary Treasury market.
When issued When-issued bonds are those Treasuries whose auctions have been announced
but have not yet settled.
2. Deﬁnition of the Subject and Its Importance
This article discusses the microstructure of the U.S. Treasury securities market.
U.S. Treasury securities are default risk free debt instruments issued by the U.S. government.
These securities play an important, even unique, role in international ﬁnancial markets because
of their safety, liquidity, and low transactions costs. Treasury instruments are often the preferred
safe haven during ﬁnancial crises, a process often referred to as a “ﬂight to quality.”
2According to the U.S. Treasury, there was more than $9 trillion in U.S. government debt
outstanding as of August 31, 2007. Of this quantity, the public holds more than $5 trillion and
$4.5 trillion is tradable on ﬁnancial markets. Foreigners hold approximately $2.4 trillion of the
marketable supply, with Japan and China together holding more than $1 trillion. According to
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), average daily trading volume
in the U.S. Treasury market in 2007 was $524.7 billion.
Microstructure is the study of the institutional details of markets and trading behavior. Mi-
crostructural analysis takes three ideas seriously that are often overlooked: the institutional features
of the trading process inﬂuence how private information is impounded into prices; agents are het-
erogeneous; and information is asymmetric. Empirical microstructure research studies topics such
as the causes and eﬀects of market structure, how market structure inﬂuences price discovery, how
trading and order ﬂow reveal private information, how quickly public information is impounded
into prices, the volatility-volume relation, and the determinants of transactions costs (i.e., the
components of bid-ask spreads). The relatively recent availability of tick-by-tick ﬁnancial data and
limit order book data, as well as the computer resources to manipulate them, have been a great
boon to ﬁnancial market microstructure research.
3. Introduction
We begin by describing the types of Treasury issues and the major Treasury market participants,
including the Federal Reserve, primary dealers and the major electronic brokers. We then outline
the stages of the Treasury market, from auction announcements to the secondary market. Next,
we examine several closely related areas of the literature: Seasonality in the Treasury market and
the reactions of the Treasury market to macro and monetary announcements; discontinuities in
Treasury prices; and the eﬀect of order ﬂow in Treasury markets. We then discuss modeling and
other academic questions about the Treasury market.
4. Types of Treasury Issues
As of October 2007, the U.S. Treasury issued four types of debt instruments. The shortest-maturity
instruments are known as Treasury bills. 22.6% of the marketable U.S. debt is in bills, securities
with maturities of 1 year or less. Bills are sold at a discount and redeemed at their face value at
3maturity. They do not pay any coupons prior to maturity and currently have maturities up to 26
weeks. Treasury bill prices are usually quoted in “discount rate” terms, which are calculated with
an actual/360 day count convention,
T-bill discount rate = [face value — bill price] × (360/number of days until maturity).
Thus, a bill with a face value of $100,000, a cash price of $97,500 and 90 days to maturity will
have a discount rate of 10% = [100−97.5]×(360/90) in a newspaper. Treasury bill yields are often
quoted as “bond equivalent yields,” which are deﬁned as,
T-bill yield = [
face value − bill price
bill price
] × (365/number of days until maturity).
Treasury instruments with intermediate maturities (2-, 5- and 10-year) are known as Treasury
notes. Notes pay semi-annual coupons, and make up 54.7% of the debt. In February 2006, the
U.S. Treasury also resumed issuing 30-year instruments, known as Treasury bonds. Bonds also pay
semi-annual coupons, and make up 12.5% of the U.S. debt.
The price of both notes and bonds are quoted as a percentage of their face value in thirty-
seconds of a point. A quoted price of 98-08 means that the quoted price of the note (or bond) is
(98+8/32=) $98.25 for each $100 of face value. The cash price of bonds and notes is equal to the
quoted price plus accrued interest since the last coupon payment, calculated with an actual/actual
day count convention. Quoted prices are sometimes called “clean” prices, while cash prices are
said to be “dirty.”
The U.S. Treasury also issues 5-, 10-, and 20-year Treasury Inﬂation-Protected Securities
(“TIPS”), whose payoﬀ is linked to changes in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). These
make up about 10.2% of the total value of Treasuries outstanding. The principal value of TIPS is
adjusted daily and the semi-annual coupon payments and principal payment are then based on the
adjusted principal amount. Economists extract inﬂation forecasts by comparing the TIPS yields to
those on similar nominal instruments. The Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis provides “TIPS
spreads” through its publication, Monetary Trends.
There is also an active market in STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal
of Securities) which are popularly known as “zero coupon” bonds. These instruments are created
by the Treasury through an accounting system which separates coupon interest payments and
principal. Finally, the U.S. Treasury also issues savings bonds, low denomination securities for
retail investors.
45. Treasury Market Participants
5.1 The Federal Reserve in the Treasury Market
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, under the guidance of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), is a uniquely important player in the Treasury market. The FOMC meets approximately
every six weeks to review economic conditions and determine a target for the federal funds rate,
the rate at which U.S. banks borrow/lend reserve balances from/to each other. The manager of
the Open Market Desk (a.k.a., “the Desk”) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is responsible
for ensuring that the average federal funds transaction is close to the target by buying and selling
Treasury instruments (primarily short-term). In practice, the Desk accomplishes this in two ways.
First the Desk buys suﬃcient Treasuries to satisfy most but not all the markets’ demand for deposits
at the Fed. Secondly, the Desk buys Treasuries via repurchase (repos) agreements (overnight and
for terms of several days) to achieve a desired repo rate that inﬂuences the federal funds rate and
other short-term interest rates through arbitrage.
To determine day-to-day actions, every morning, staﬀ at both the Division of Monetary Aﬀairs
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Desk forecast that day’s demand
for reserve balances. The Desk staﬀ also consults market participants to get their views on ﬁnancial
conditions. The relevant Desk and Board staﬀs then exchange views in a 9 am conference call.
Finally, the relevant Desk staﬀ, the Board staﬀ, and at least one of the voting Reserve Bank
Presidents then confer during a second conference call at about 9:20 am. The Desk staﬀ summarizes
market conditions, projects actions for the day and asks the voting Reserve Bank President(s) for
comments. Open market operations commence shortly after the conclusion of this call.
When the Desk buys Treasuries, it increases available liquidity (reserves) in debt markets and
tends to lower interest rates. Selling Treasuries has the opposite eﬀect, lowering reserves and
raising interest rates. If the intention is to make a permanent change in reserves, then outright
purchases or sales are undertaken. In contrast, if the Desk anticipates that only temporary changes
in reserves are necessary, it uses repos (for purchases) or reverse repos (for sales). Bernanke [7]
notes that actual open market sales of debt instruments are rare; it is more common for the Federal
Reserve to allow such securities to expire without replacing them. Both open market sales and
allowing the Fed’s securities to expire have the same balance sheet eﬀects: The Fed holds fewer
bonds and more cash, while the public will hold more bonds and less cash.
5The Federal Reserve provides several valuable references on its operating procedures. The
Annual Report of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York describes open
market operations and current procedures (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Markets Group
[26]). Meulendyke [57] provides a comprehensive view of Federal Reserve monetary policy opera-
tions with a historical perspective. Akhtar [1] explains how monetary policy is decided and how
such policies aﬀect the economy. Finally, Harvey and Huang [43] gives some historical perspective
on operating procedures in the 1980s.
5.2 Primary dealers
Among the most important private sector players in the Treasury markets are the 21 primary
dealers. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York explains that primary dealers must “participate
meaningfully in both the Fed’s open market operations and Treasury auctions and...provide the
Fed’s trading desk with market information and analysis that are helpful in the formulation and
implementation of monetary policy.” The Federal Reserve does not regulate primary dealers, but
does subject them to capital requirements. The Federal Reserve can withdraw a ﬁrm’s primary
dealer designation if it fails to participate in auctions or open market operations or if its capital
reserves fall below desired levels.
The daily average trading volume in U.S. Government securities of all the primary dealers was
approximately $550 billion during 2005.
5.3 Interdealer Brokers
Prior to 2000, voice-assisted brokers dominated secondary market trading in Treasuries. Except
for Cantor-Fitzgerald, all these brokers reported their trading activity to GovPX, a consortium.
In the face of demands by the Securities and Exchange Commission and bond market dealers for
greater transparency, ﬁve IDBs formed GovPX as a joint venture in 1991. In March 1999, Cantor-
Fitzgerald opened up its internal electronic trading platform, eSpeed, to clients. The eSpeed
system quickly grabbed a dominant market share, and Cantor Fitzgerald spun oﬀ eSpeed as a
public company in December 1999. In 2000, a competing electronic brokerage, BrokerTec, joined
the market. As in foreign exchange and equity markets, most interdealer and institutional trading
in Treasuries quickly migrated from voice networks to these electronic communications networks
(ECNs), which have dominated trading in Treasury instruments since 2001. Mizrach and Neely
[58] describe the transition from voice assisted trading, largely through the primary dealers, to
6electronic trading in the Treasury market.
As of November 2007, the two dominant ECNs are eSpeed and BrokerTec. London-based ICAP,
PLC, owns BrokerTec while eSpeed merged in the summer of 2007 with BGC, another London
based interdealer brokerage. eSpeed and ICAP compete for both on- and oﬀ-the-run liquidity.
Hilliard Farber and Tullett-Prebon hold the largest brokerage share outside of the dominant two
platforms.
6. Stages of the Treasury Bond Market
The sale of Treasuries undergoes four distinct phases: when issued, primary, on-the-run and oﬀ-
the-run. Each of these stages has a distinct market structure.
6.1 The Primary Market
In the primary market, the U.S. Treasury sells debt to the public via auction. The U.S. Treasury
usually publishes a calendar of upcoming tentative auction dates on the ﬁrst Wednesday of Feb-
ruary, May, August, and November and bids may be submitted up to 30 days in advance of the
auction. In practice, however, the Treasury only announces ﬁrm auction information several days
in advance and most bids are submitted at that time. Since August 8, 2002, the Treasury has made
auction announcements (for all new securities) at 11:00 AM Eastern Time (ET). 13- and 26-week
bills are auctioned weekly; 2- and 5-year notes are auctioned monthly; 10-year notes are auctioned
eight times a year. 30-year bonds, which were reintroduced on February 9, 2006 after a ﬁve year
hiatus, are auctioned four times a year.
The U.S. Treasury has used a single price auction exclusively since November 1998. Garbade
and Ingber [35] discuss the transition from multiple price auctions to the current format single price
auctions. All securities are allocated to bidders at the price that, in the aggregate, will result in the
sale of the entire issue. This mitigates the risk of a “buyer’s curse”–the highest bidder paying more
than other auction participants. To prevent a single large buyer from manipulating the auction, the
Treasury restricts anyone from buying more than 35% of any single issue. Bids may be submitted
up to thirty days prior to the auction, and large institutions make use of the Treasury Automated
Auction Processing System (TAAPS). Retail investors can participate through the Treasury Direct
program. The Treasury allocates a portion of nearly every auction to small investors at the same
price as the large institutions. These are called non-competitive bids, and they are quantity only
7orders that are ﬁlled at the market clearing price.
Primary dealers dominate the auction process. In 2003, they submitted 86% of auction bids,
totalling more than $6 trillion. They were awarded $2.4 trillion, or 78% of the total auction supply.
6.2 The Secondary Market
The secondary market is composed of the when-issued, on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run issues.
When-Issued
Even prior to the primary auction, there is an active forward market in Treasury securities
(apart from TIPS) that are about to be issued. Trading in the when-issued security market
typically begins several days prior to an auction and continues until settlement of auction purchases.
Nyborg and Sundaresan [61] document that when-issued trading provides important information
about auction prices prior to the auction and also permits market participants to reduce the risk
they take in bidding. Fabozzi and Fleming [25] estimate that 6% of total interdealer trading is in
the when-issued market. Just prior to auctions though, these markets become substantially more
active. In the bill market, when-issued trading volume exceeds the volume for the bills from the
previous auction.
On-the-Run
Upon completion of the auction, the most recently issued bill, note or bond becomes on-
the-run and the previous on-the-run issue goes oﬀ-the-run. Overall Treasury trading volume is
concentrated in a small number of on-the-run issues. Trading in these benchmark on-the-run
issues, which Fabozzi and Fleming [25] say constitutes approximately 70% of total trading volume,
has migrated almost completely to the electronic networks. Mizrach and Neely [58] estimate a 61%
market share for the BrokerTec platform and a 39% share for eSpeed in 2005, which is consistent
with industry estimates.
Oﬀ-the-Run
With more than 200 oﬀ-the-run issues trading in October 2007–44 bills, 116 notes, and 45
bonds–most oﬀ-the-run volume takes place in voice and electronic interdealer networks. Barclay,
Hendershott and Kotz [5] document the fall in ECN market share when issues go oﬀ the run.
They also report that transaction volume falls by more than 90%, on average, once a bond goes
8oﬀ-the-run. The ECN market share falls from 75.2% to 9.9% for the 2-year notes, from 83.5% to
8.5% for the 5-year notes, and from 84.5% to 8.9% for the 10-year notes. Several IDBs handle most
oﬀ-the-run securities trading.
On- versus Oﬀ-the-Run Liquidity and Prices
Oﬀ-the-run securities trade at a higher yield (lower price) than on-the-run securities of similar
maturity. Many researchers have attempted to explain the yield diﬀerential with relative liquidity.
Vayanos and Weill [68] utilize a search theoretic model that is motivated by the fact that bonds
may be diﬃcult to locate once they go oﬀ-the-run. Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath [36] compare on-
the-run and oﬀ-the-run Treasuries and show that the liquidity premium depends primarily on the
amount of remaining future liquidity, which is highly predictable. The study exploits the fact that
the liquidity of a Treasury is predictable. Duﬃe [18] argues that legal or institutional restrictions
on supplying collateral induces “special” repo rates that are much less than market riskless interest
rates. The price of the underlying instrument is increased by the present value of the savings in
borrowing costs.
Supply Variation and Prices
Although it is generally accepted that the on-the-run premium is due to greater liquidity, the
theoretical relation between the supply of a given bond issue and prices is not clear. Do issue
sizes produce lower yields (higher prices) through their liquidity eﬀects or whether downward-
sloping demand for individual securities would produce higher prices (lower yields) for larger issues?
Empirically, the evidence is mixed. Simon [65], [66], Duﬃe [18], Seligman [64] and Fleming [29] ﬁnd
that the larger issues lead to lower prices (higher yields), while Amihud and Mendelson [2], Kamara
[51], Warga [69], and Elton and Green [23] ﬁnd the opposite: The liquidity eﬀect predominates,
resulting in higher prices (lower yields) for larger issues. There might be a nonlinear relationship.
Liquidity may increase prices up to a certain point, but then ﬁnite demand for any individual
security reduces the attractiveness of additional supply.
7. The Treasury Futures Market
Spot markets are not the only markets for U.S. Treasuries. The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
has active futures markets for 2-, 5-, 10- and 30-year U.S. Treasuries. Table 1 brieﬂy describes
9the CBOT contracts and pricing conventions.
[INSERT Table 1 HERE]
Like other exchange-traded derivatives, Treasury futures have two advantages: trading is highly
liquid and marking-to-market minimizes counterparty risk. The CBOT open auction trading hours
are 7:20 am to 2:00 pm, Central Time, Monday through Friday; the CBOT electronic market
functions from 6:00 pm to 4:00 pm, Central Time, Sunday through Friday. All Treasury contracts
have a March-June-September-December cycle.
A variety of Treasury instruments meet the criteria to be deliverable issues. Table 1 describes
the pricing conventions and the characteristics of the assets that may be delivered to satisfy the
contracts. The CBOT deﬁnes “conversion factors” that adjust the quoted futures prices for the
asset that is actually delivered. Despite these conversion factors, one issue will be the “cheapest to
deliver.” Cash prices at delivery depend on both the conversion factor for a particular bond and
the interest accrued on that bond since the last coupon payment.
Although agents frequently use the futures markets for hedging or taking positions on future
price movements, only a modest amount of microstructure research has focused on futures markets.
Brandt, Kavajecz, and Underwood [11] show that futures and spot market order ﬂow are useful in
predicting daily returns in each market and that the type of trader inﬂuences the eﬀect of order
ﬂow. Mizrach and Neely [59] show that futures markets contribute a substantial amount of price
discovery to U.S. Treasury markets. Campbell and Hendry [12] compare price discovery in the
10-year bond and futures contracts in both the United States and Canada.
8. Seasonality and Announcement Eﬀects
Seasonality and announcement eﬀects are intimately related to the microstructure literature in
that the latter seeks to explain how markets with heterogeneous agents react to the release of
information.
8.1 Seasonality and macroeconomic announcements
The earliest studies considered the issue of daily seasonality in Treasuries. Flannery and Pro-
topapadakis [27] document diﬀering day-of-the-week patterns in Treasuries and stock indices. The
patterns in the prices of Treasuries securities vary by maturity and diﬀer from those found in stock
10indices. They conclude that no single factor explains seasonal patterns across asset classes. In con-
trast to this day-of-the-week eﬀect in spot T-bills, Johnston et al. [50] ﬁnd day-of-the-week eﬀects
in government national mortgage association (GNMA) securities, T-note, and T-bond futures, but
not in T-bill futures. The fact that day-of-the-week eﬀects exist in spot T-bills but not in T-bill
futures points up the importance of futures settlement rules.
Later studies began to consider the eﬀects of macro announcements on price changes, volatility,
volume and spreads. Macroeconomic announcements have been an especially popular subject of
study because they occur at regular intervals that can be anticipated by market participants.
The existence of survey expectations about upcoming macro announcements permits researchers
to identify the “shock” component of the announcement, which allows them to investigate the
diﬀerential eﬀects of anticipated and unanticipated news releases of diﬀerent magnitudes.
Ederington and Lee [20] [21] did the seminal modern work with intraday data on macro an-
nouncement eﬀects in bond markets. They found that volatility increases before the announcement
and remains elevated for some time afterwards. The employment, PPI, CPI and durable goods
orders releases produce the greatest impact of the 9 signiﬁcant announcements, out of 16 studied.
Ederington and Lee [22] follow up on their earlier studies by linking the literatures on seasonality
and announcements in the bond market. Comparing the contributions of past volatility, seasonality
and announcements in predicting intraday volatility bond futures data and exchange rates, these
authors argue that announcements account for much of the apparent seasonality in interest rate
volatility.
One of the earliest important results was that bond market prices react more strongly to macro
announcements than do equity markets. Fleming and Remolona [32] [34] examined the 25 largest
price changes in the GovPX data and related them all to macroeconomic announcements. Fleming
and Remolona [34] note: “In contrast to stock prices, U.S. Treasury security prices largely react to
the arrival of public information on the economy.” Fleming and Remolona [32] [33] attribute the
relative sensitivity of bond markets to the fact that bond prices depend only on expected discount
rates while stock prices are also determined by future expected dividends. Macro announcements
can have little or no eﬀect on stock prices if their eﬀects on expected dividends and discount rates
oﬀset each other.
Several studies used more sophisticated econometric procedures to evaluate the impact of an-
nouncements on persistence in volatility in a full model. Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine [49] exam-
11ine volatility patterns in the 5-year Treasury market around U.S. announcements. Daily volatility
from an ARCH-M does not persist for days after announcements and the authors interpret this as
indicating that agents rapidly incorporate announcement information into prices. Weekly volatility
displays a U-shaped pattern; the largest price changes occur on Mondays and Fridays. Further,
Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine [49] ﬁnd a risk premium in returns on days of announcements.
Bollerslev, Cai, and Song [8] also consider the interaction of announcements and persistence in
volatility with 5-minute U.S. Treasury bond data. Modeling the intraday volatility patterns and
accounting for announcements reveals long-memory in bond market volatility.
An important issue in microstructure is the determination of bid-ask spreads. Balduzzi, Elton,
and Green [4] use intraday GovPX data to look at the eﬀects of macro announcements on volume,
prices and spreads. Conﬁrming previous ﬁndings, prices adjust to news within one minute while
increases in volatility and volume persist for up to 60 minutes. Spreads initially widen but then
return to normal after 5 to 15 minutes. News releases explain a substantial amount of bond market
volatility. Importantly, Balduzzi, Elton, and Green [4] argue that the diﬀerential impact of news
on long and short bond prices indicates that at least two factors will be needed for models of the
yield curve. They also present evidence that discontinuities (jumps) will be important in modeling
bond prices.
Some recent papers have relaxed the restrictive assumption that announcements inﬂuence Trea-
sury market variables in a linear, symmetric fashion. For example, Christie-David, Chaudhry, and
Lindley [15] allow the eﬀects of announcement shocks to depend on the size and sign of the shock.
They measure these nonlinear eﬀects on the intraday 10- and 30-year Treasury futures from 1992
to 1996.
Most studies of the eﬀects of volatility have measured such variation with some function of
squared returns. One can use the volatility implied by options prices, however, to measure expected
volatility over longer horizons. Heuson and Su [45], for example, show that implied volatilities from
options on Treasuries rise prior to macro announcements and that volatilities quickly return to
normal levels after announcements. Beber and Brandt [6] use intraday, tick data from 1995 to 1999
to determine that macro announcements reduce the variance of the option-implied distribution of
U.S. Treasury bond prices. The content of the news and economic conditions explain these changes
in higher-order moments. The study attributes the results to time-varying risk premia rather than
relative mispricing or changing beliefs.
12In a comprehensive study of the impact of U.S. macroeconomic announcements across asset
markets, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega [3] study the reaction of international equity,
bond and foreign exchange markets. They conﬁrm that U.S. macroeconomic news drives bond
prices, as well as those of the other assets.
8.2 Monetary policy announcements
Researchers have carefully investigated the eﬀects of the Federal Reserve’s actions on the Treasury
market. While the literature has examined the eﬀect of a wide variety of monetary policy behavior
and communications–e.g., open market operations, FOMC news releases, speeches, etc.–on many
aspects of Treasury market behavior, a large subset of these papers deal with one speciﬁc topic:
The eﬀect of federal funds target changes on the Treasury yield curve.
8.2.1 Federal funds target changes and the Treasury yield curve
The “expectations hypothesis of the term structure” motivates research on how the short- and
long-end of the Treasury yield curve react to unexpected changes in the federal funds target rate.
That is, if the FOMC increases overnight interest rates, how does this change short- and long-term
rates?
Using data on 75 changes in the federal funds target from September 1974 through September
1979, Cook and Hahn [16] ﬁnd that these target changes caused larger movements in short-term
rates than in intermediate- and long-term Treasury rates. A diﬃculty with interpreting the Cook
and Hahn [16] results is that eﬃcient markets presumably can often anticipate most or all of a
target change and such expectations are already incorporated into the yield curve. To confront this
problem, Kuttner [53] decomposes target changes into anticipated and unanticipated components,
ﬁnding–unsurprisingly–that Treasury rates respond much more strongly to unanticipated changes
and that the results are consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. That
is, the anticipated component of an interest rate change does not aﬀect expectations. Hamilton
[41] carefully reexamines the work of Kuttner [53], showing that it is robust to uncertainty about
the dates of target changes and the eﬀect of learning by market participants.
Poole and Rasche [62] also decompose federal funds target changes into expected and unex-
pected components–but use a later contract month than Kuttner [53] to avoid problems associated
with computation of the contract payoﬀ. They ﬁnd that interest rates across the maturity spectrum
fail to respond to the anticipated components of the changes in the intended funds rate.
13Poole, Rasche and Thornton [63] consider how changes in FOMC procedures aﬀect the impact
of target changes on interest rates. This study ﬁrst succinctly describes the changes in FOMC
procedures in the 1990s. The FOMC began to contemporaneously announce policy actions in 1994
and adopted this as formal policy in 1995. Starting in August 1997, each policy directive has
included the quantitative value of the “intended federal funds rate.” And since 1999, the FOMC
has issued a press release after each meeting with the value for the “intended federal funds rate"
and, in most cases, an assessment of the balance of risks. After describing such procedural changes,
Poole, Rasche and Thornton [63] go on to consider the response of the Treasury yield curve to funds
rate target changes both before and after the FOMC began contemporaneously announcing target
changes in 1994. In doing so, these authors account for measurement error in expectations and
uncertainty about the dates of target changes and even whether market participants understood
that the Federal Reserve was targeting the funds rate prior to 1994. They assess the market’s
knowledge of targeting by examining news reports. While short-rates respond similarly in both
subperiods, long rates do not respond as strongly to funds rate target changes after 1994. The
authors interpret their results as being consistent with the Fed’s greater transparency about long-
run policy in the second subsample. With long-run expectations more ﬁrmly anchored, unexpected
changes in the funds target have smaller eﬀects on long rates.
One puzzle that has emerged from this literature is that the average eﬀect of changes in the
federal funds target on the yield curve is modest, despite the facts that such changes should be
an important determinant of the yield curve and that yields are highly volatile around FOMC
announcements. Fleming and Piazzesi [31] claim to partially resolve this puzzle by illustrating
that such yield changes depend on the shape of the yield curve.
This literature on the reaction of the Treasury market to monetary policy has become progres-
sively more sophisticated in assessing market expectations of Fed policy and modeling institutional
features of the futures market and Fed operations. Nevertheless, the underlying conclusion that
unanticipated target changes lead to large price increases on short-term Treasuries and smaller
changes on the prices of long-term Treasuries has been remarkably robust.
8.2.2 Other Federal Reserve behavior and the Treasury market
There has been a substantial literature analyzing how other types of Federal Reserve behavior have
inﬂuenced the Treasury market. The literature has considered open market operations, FOMC
statements, Congressional testimonies, and FOMC member speeches.
14Open market operations are similar to macroeconomic announcements in that they are poten-
tially important bond market events, occurring at regularly scheduled times. Harvey and Huang
[43] used intraday data from 1982 to 1988 to examine how Federal Reserve open market operations
inﬂuenced foreign exchange and bond markets. The paper ﬁnds that Treasury market volatility
increases during open market operations, irrespective of whether they add or drain reserves. Oddly,
volatility increases even more during the usual time for open market operations if there are no such
transactions. The authors interpret this ﬁnding as indicating that open market operations actually
smooth volatility.
Early studies made the simplifying assumption that the eﬀect of macro announcements on the
Treasury market was constant over time. This is not necessarily the case, of course. For example,
the eﬀect of macro announcements on the Treasury market might depend on monetary policy
priorities. Kearney [52] characterizes the changing response of daily 3-month Treasury futures to
the employment report over 1977 to 1997 and relates it to the changing importance of employment
in the Fed’s reaction function.
de Goeij and Marquering [17] also considers how both macro announcements and monetary
policy events aﬀect the U.S. Treasury market. Using daily data from 1982 to 2004 de Goeij and
Marquering [17] ﬁnd that macro news announcements strongly aﬀect the daily volatility of longer-
term Treasury instruments while FOMC events aﬀect the volatility of shorter-term instruments.
Some studies have explored more esoteric components of information about monetary policy.
Boukus and Rosenberg [9], for example, use Latent Semantic Analysis to decompose the information
content of FOMC minutes from 1987 to 2005. They then relate the information content to current
and future economic conditions. Chirinko and Curran [13] argue that Federal Reserve speeches,
testimonies, and meetings increase price and trading volatility on the 30-year bond market. FOMC
meetings are the most important of the events considered. They go on to consider whether these
Federal Reserve events merely create noise or transmit information about the future policy decisions
or the state of the economy. They conclude that such events may reduce welfare by “overwhelming
private information,” creating herding behavior.
8.3 Announcements and Liquidity Variation
The literature on variation in liquidity and price eﬀects overlaps with the literature on macro-
economic announcements. The seminal work of Amihud and Mendelson [2] showed that yields
on short-time-to-maturity Treasuries vary inversely with liquidity. That is, more liquid assets
15have lower yields/higher prices. Harvey and Huang [43] discovered elevated volatility in interest
rate (and foreign exchange) futures markets, in the ﬁrst 60-70 minutes of trading on Thursdays
and Fridays. Ederington and Lee [20] conﬁrmed Harvey and Huang [43]’s speculation that major
macroeconomic announcements–especially the employment report, the PPI, the CPI, and durable
goods orders–create the intraday and intraweek patterns in the volatility of Treasury bond futures.
Volatility is very high after announcements and remains elevated for hours. Fleming and Remolona
[32] extend this work to show that the 25 greatest surges in activity in the 5-year on-the-run bond
market came on macroeconomic announcement days, within 70 minutes of the announcement. The
most important announcements for trading surges were employment reports, fed funds targets, 30-
year auctions, 10-year auctions, the CPI, NAPM surveys, GDP, retail sales, and 3-year auctions.
Releases that aﬀect prices also matter for trading activity. Fleming and Remolona [32] observe
that timeliness, the degree of surprise in the announcement and market uncertainty also increase
announcements’ impact on trading.
Researchers continued to explore the impact of variation in liquidity caused by other events.
For example, Fleming [28] exploits exogenous variation in Treasury issuance to show that securities
that are “reopened”–the Treasury sells additional quantities of existing securities–have greater
liquidity, lower spreads, than comparable assets. Paradoxically, this higher liquidity does not
produce lower yields for the reopened securities.
More recent papers have explored variation in liquidity and volatility across markets. Chordia,
Sarkar and Subrahmanyam [14] estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) in liquidity and volatil-
ity variables in stock and bond markets. They ﬁnd that common factors make the variables’
innovations highly correlated. Volatility shocks predict liquidity variables.
8.4 End-of-the-year patterns in one-month Treasury Bills
The previous sets of papers studied daily and intraday seasonality, often as caused by macroeco-
nomic or Federal Reserve announcements. Short-term Treasury bills also exhibit year-end season-
ality, however. Market participants consider Treasury market instruments of 30 days or less to be
highly liquid, close–but not perfect–substitutes for cash. The fact that short-term Treasuries are
not perfect substitutes for cash is presumably what allows the New York Desk to use open market
operations to manipulate short-term interest rates through a liquidity eﬀect. A peculiar year-end
pattern in one-month Treasury yields reinforces this evidence that such Treasuries are not perfect
substitutes for cash.
16Following on related work of Griﬃths and Winters [40] in repos, Griﬃths and Winters [39]
ﬁnd that yields on one month T-Bills (and other one-month securities) increase signiﬁcantly at the
beginning of December, remain high during December, and return to normal a few days before the
year-end. This pattern does not exist in three-month T-bills. Neely and Winters [60] ﬁnd similar
patterns in the one-month LIBOR futures market.
Griﬃths and Winters [38] [39] [40] explain this December eﬀect by asserting that a year-end
preference for liquidity drives the year-end surge in short-term interest rates. Debt holder (lenders
in the money markets) start to liquidate their one-month securities in the last few days of November
to meet cash obligations at the end-of-December. This preference for liquidity drives up one-month
interest rates for most of December. Liquidity demand returns to normal at the end of December
as investors repurchase short-term instruments, and interest rates return to normal levels.
9. Discontinuities in the U.S. Treasury Market
The literature on discontinuities (or jumps) in Treasury prices is closely related to the literature on
announcements, as announcements are obvious candidates to explain jumps. Three recent papers
have looked at discontinuities in U.S. Treasury prices. Huang [47] estimates daily jumps with
bi-power variation on 10 years of 5-minute data on S&P 500 and U.S. T-bond futures to measure
the response of volatility and jumps to macro news. He identiﬁes a major role for payroll news
in bond market jumps by analyzing their conditional distributions and regressing continuous and
jump components on measures of disagreement and uncertainty concerning future macroeconomic
states. Huang [47] also ﬁnds that the bond market is relatively more responsive than the equity
market.
Dungey, McKenzie, and Smith [19] estimate jumps and cojumps (simultaneous discontinuities
in multiple markets) in the term structure of U.S. Treasury rates. They ﬁnd that the middle of
the yield curve often cojumps with one of the ends, while the ends of the curve exhibit a greater
tendency for idiosyncratic jumps. Macro news is strongly associated with cojumps in the term
structure. Using BrokerTec data from 2003-2005, Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan [48] extend this work
by focusing on the role of liquidity shocks–estimated from the limit order book–in jumps and
the relation of jumps to order ﬂow and price discovery.
Lahaye, Laurent and Neely [54] examine jumps and cojumps across foreign exchange, stock,
gold and 30-year Treasury futures. Discontinuities in bond futures prices were larger but less
17frequent than those in foreign exchange rates and smaller and about as frequent as those in equity
markets. News announcements appear to cause many cojumps of bond prices with prices of other
types of assets.
10. Order Flow in the U.S. Treasury Market
The eﬀect of order ﬂow on prices has been a popular recent topic in microstructure. Several
papers have explored the impact of order ﬂow on prices and the ways in which macro/monetary
announcements inﬂuence these impacts.
Huang, Cai, and Wang [46] use intraday 1998 GovPX spot data on the 5-year Treasury note
to characterize trading patterns of primary dealers, announcement eﬀects and volatility-volume
relations. The paper ﬁnds that both public information (i.e., announcements) and dealer inven-
tory/order ﬂow aﬀect trading frequency.
Green [37] uses the Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans [55] model to study the impact of
GovPX trading in 5-year around announcements. Order ﬂow has its largest price impact after
larger macro surprises, times of greater uncertainty about the announcement, and times of high
liquidity. Green [37] concludes that order ﬂow does reveal information about riskless rates.
Brandt and Kavajecz [10] ﬁnd that order ﬂow imbalances can explain up to 26% of the day-
to-day variation in yields on non-announcement days. In contrast to Green [37], they ﬁnd that
order ﬂow has its strongest impact at times of low liquidity. Brandt, Kavacejz, and Underwood
[11] extend the work of Brandt and Kavajecz [10] to control for trader type and macroeconomic
announcements in explaining the impact of bond market order ﬂow on futures prices.
Menkveld, Sarkar, and Van der Wel [56] conﬁrm earlier conclusions that announcements have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on 30-year Treasury yields and they also ﬁnd that customer order ﬂow is much
more informative on announcement days than on non-announcement days. They go on to inves-
tigate the proﬁts that diﬀerent types of traders make on announcement and non-announcement
days.
At high frequencies, order ﬂow is highly autocorrelated. A dynamic analysis of the market
resilience requires modeling this formally. We turn to empirical modeling of the Treasury market
order book in the next section.
1811. Modeling The Limit Order Book
A purchase or a sale of a Treasury bond inﬂuences prices directly as trades work their way up the
supply or demand curves. We would like to know whether these eﬀects are large and long-lasting.
To address this question, we must introduce a dynamic model of the limit order book.
Hasbrouck [44] proposed to study intra-day price formation with a standard bivariate vector
autoregressive (VAR) model. Time t here is measured in 1-minute intervals. Let rt be the per-
centage change in the transaction price and x0
t be the sum of signed trade indicators (+1 for buyer
initiated, −1 for seller initiated) over minute t. Treasury market data sets typically indicate trade
initiation as a “hit” −1 or a “take” +1.
The bivariate vector autoregression assumes that causality ﬂows from trade initiation to returns
by permitting rt to depend on the contemporaneous value for x0
t, but not allowing x0
t to depend

























Mizrach and Neely [58] use 5 lags of the return series and 15 lags of the signed trades. The market




Mizrach and Neely [58] provide 15 minute market impact estimates from the GovPX market in
1999. The 2-year note is most resilient with prices only 0.0042% higher following a buyer initiated
trade. The 30-year bond is the least liquid, with prices rising 0.0229% following a buy order.
Mizrach and Neely also report 2004 estimates for the Cantor electronic limit order book. Market
impacts range from 45 to 88% lower in the more liquid eSpeed ECN market. Fleming and Mizrach
[30] ﬁnd further reductions in market impacts on the BrokerTec ECN for 2005 and 2006.
12. Price Discovery
A crucial issue in the market microstructure literature is price discovery. This is the process by
which prices embed new information. In the Treasury market, price discovery occurs in both the
secondary spot market and in the futures markets at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The
degree to which each market contributes to price discovery is a natural issue to address.
To investigate relative price discovery in these two Treasury markets, Mizrach and Neely [59]
19follow Hasbrouck [44] and assume that the price series have a unit root, are cointegrated, and have
an rth order VAR representation,
pt = Φ1pt−1 + Φ2pt−2 + ··· + Φrpt−r + ut,










 = ∆pt, (3)
have the convenient Engle-Granger [24] error-correction representation,
∆pt = αzt−1 + A1∆pt−1 + ··· + Ar∆pt−r−1 + ut, (4)
where zt is an error-correction term of rank N − 1.
We analyze price discovery using the moving average representation of our return process (3),
∆pt = Θ(L)εt. (5)
The disturbances are mean zero and serially uncorrelated, E[εi,t] = 0 and cov[εi,t,εi,t−r] = 0, but
they may be contemporaneously correlated, cov[εi,t,εj,t] ￿= 0.
The information share is related to the long run impulse responses, Θ(1) =
￿∞
j=0 Θ(Lj), the
permanent eﬀect of the shock vector on the Treasury prices. Cointegration makes the long run












To eliminate contemporaneous correlation among the error terms in (5), we decompose Ω =
E [εtε￿
t], the N × N covariance matrix, to ﬁnd a lower triangular matrix M, whose i,jth element
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where the θis are the elements of row i of the long-run multipliers in (6). Because the Choleski
decomposition is not unique, the information share will vary with the order of the equations in the
VAR.
Mizrach and Neely [59] pair spot and maturity matched futures for the 2-year, 5-year and
10-year on-the-run spot notes. This calculation requires us to adjust futures prices according to
the on-the-run spot instruments with which we compare them. The CBOT provides adjustment
20factors for each instrument. These adjustments typically make a single bond the cheapest to deliver
(CTD), but the CTD is typically oﬀ-the-run. Nevertheless, the CTD oﬀ-the-run bonds and the
most liquid on-the-run bonds are very close substitutes–their daily returns are highly correlated–
so it is reasonable to examine price discovery between futures prices and on-the-run bonds, despite
the fact that they are not identical.
Mizrach and Neely [59] ﬁnd that information shares rise with the growth of the GovPX market,
but fall as the ECNs take market share from GovPX voice markets. The spot market share is
highest for the 2-year note, reaching 86%, while the 10-year spot market share never exceeds 50%.
In addition, relative market liquidity measures like spreads, trades and volatility each strongly
explain daily relative price discovery shares. Mizrach and Neely [59] compute both upper and
lower bound estimates of the information shares. They also report estimates based on the Harris,
McInish and Wood [42] methodology.
Campbell and Hendry [12] ﬁnd similar results for the Canadian government bond market. They
ﬁnd that the information share in the 10-year spot note is below 50% in nearly all their sample of
several months between 2002 and 2004. Upper and Werner [67] ﬁnd that price discovery in the
German Bund is dominated by the futures market, and in times of stress, like the 1998 Long Term
Capital Management Crisis, the spot market information share falls to essentially zero. Upper
and Werner [67], however, compare the futures market to the relatively illiquid, CTD bonds. This
might explain their ﬁnding that the spot market does very little price discovery.
13. Future Directions
This article has reviewed the microstructure of the U.S. Treasury market. The Open Market Desk
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York plays a uniquely important role in the Treasury market
by using transactions in those securities to adjust the level of bank reserves. Primary dealers are
key players in both Treasury auctions and the Fed’s open market operations. The Treasury market
consists of several phases: when-issued, primary, on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run. Two ECNs, eSpeed
and BrokerTec, intermediate the most active trading, during the on-the-run phase. The Treasury
futures market at the CBOT complements trading in the spot market.
Treasury markets exhibit end-of-year, daily and intraday seasonality. Macro and Federal Re-
serve announcements are responsible for a substantial part of the daily and intraday seasonality.
The literature studying the impact of order ﬂows on Treasury prices has also considered how macro
21news and Federal Reserve actions inﬂuence such impact.
The futures markets in Chicago play an important role in price discovery, and a discussion of
Treasury microstructure needs to take this into account. Both spot and futures markets are quite
resilient and recent research on the Treasury ECNs suggest that the market continues to become
more liquid. Fleming and Mizrach [30] report that volume has increased almost 5 times since 2001.
This increase in trading volume accompanies a decline in the importance of the primary dealers.
Beales and Titt reported in the Financial Times in March 2007 that hedge funds now account for
80% of trading activity in the Treasury market with only a 20% share for the primary dealers. One
large fund alone, Citadel, accounts for 10% of the trading volume on eSpeed and BrokerTec. It
was perhaps inevitable that trading by the millisecond would come to the Treasury market as it
did to equities and foreign exchange. Perhaps we should only be surprised that it took so long.
The Treasury market plays a central role in the credit market. Times of ﬁnancial crisis highlight
the Treasury market’s role as a safe haven for investors both in the U.S. and overseas. Treasury
securities also serve as benchmarks for complex derivatives like mortgage backed securities and
structured loans like collateralized debt obligations. The microstructure of the U.S. Treasury
market is fundamental to our understanding of the global ﬁnancial markets.
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27Table 1
Contract Details from the CBOT Treasury Market
Contract Quote convention Pricing example Deliverable asset characteristics
2-year 1/32 95-060 = 95 + 6/32 U.S. Treasury notes with a face value ≥ $200,000 and
& quarters of 32nds 95-062 = 95 + 6.25/32 original maturity ≤ 5 years and 3 months and
95-065 = 95 + 6.5/32 remaining maturity ≥ 1 year and 9 months from the ﬁrst day of the delivery month and
95-067 = 95 + 6.75/32 and remaining maturity ≤ than 2 years from the last day of the delivery month.
5-year 1/32 90-170 = 90+17/32 U.S. Treasury notes with a face value ≥ $100,000 and
and halves of 32nds 90-175 = 90 + 17.5/32 original maturity ≤ 5 years and 3 months and
remaining maturity ≥ 4 year and 2 months from the ﬁrst day of the delivery month
10-year 1/32 90-170 = 90+17/32 U.S. Treasury notes with a face value ≥ $100,000 and
and halves of 32nds 90-175 = 90 + 17.5/32 remaining maturity ≤ 10 years
remaining maturity ≥ 6 year and 6 months from the ﬁrst day of the delivery month
30-year 1/32nds 85 -12 = 85+12/32 U.S. Treasury bonds with a face value ≥ $100,000 and
if callable: Not callable for at least 15 years from the ﬁrst day of the delivery month;
if not callable: Remaining maturity ≥ 15 years from the ﬁrst day of the delivery month.
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